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Paper Abstract
The importance of interagency coordination within the combatant command has increased dramatically since the creation of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) in 2001.
These were the first attempts at enhancing interagency coordination inside of a combatant command staff to provide a whole of government approach. Since their inception, however, JIACGs have been organized and utilized in various ways based on the desire of the combatant commander, with differing degrees of success. AFRICOM's designers attempted to break from this uncertainty, in that they included interagency personnel directly into the staff structure and elevated the command's Political Advisor to that of Deputy Commander.
This paper will show that combatant command staffs are most efficient when organized in this manner, as opposed to strictly possessing a JIACG for interagency coordination, and recommends combatant commanders adopt this approach without waiting for Congress to legislate such a change.
INTRODUCTION
The geographic combatant commander (GCC) has immense resources at his or her disposal, including a joint staff and an interagency support group composed of various members from other government organizations. These professionals are assigned to assist the commander and his or her deputies, providing invaluable knowledge, experience, and ability in their specialized fields. The specific department representation, and the number of overall interagency representation, varies widely among the five geographic combatant commands. There is no mandated or commonly accepted structure to integrate interagency members into a combatant command. Joint interagency working groups (JIACGs) were quickly implemented following the September 11 th attacks and were a good first attempt at response and policy implementation within the GCC's Area of Responsibility (AOR). 4 With some modifications, this structure is the best compromise for combatant commanders.
Interagency organization should be entwined within the combatant commander's staff, rather than joined together as a separate entity, to provide a whole-of-government approach in an efficient manner towards successful unity of effort. This will provide a more efficient model now, without waiting for new legislation.
BACKGROUND
The US Government codified the jointness concept in 1986 with the passing of the 
PROPOSAL
To better integrate interagency personnel into the command staff and make them most efficient, they must functionally become part of the staff structure. This is the natural pinnacle of interagency cooperation: a fully-functioning and cohesive unit supporting the commander in the execution of the mission. While JIACGs were a great beginning and necessary first step, they are still segregated to some extent and therefore not the most efficient entity. Each combatant command should have a civilian deputy commander, at the same level as the military deputy, responsible to the commander for interagency coordination and to act as a foreign policy advisor. Underneath that person, concurrent with the J-codes, should be the interagency personnel. There should not be separation into a parallel command structure, but two equal halves of the same command, fully integrated under two deputies, supporting one commander. AFRICOM was designed with this construct, and there are also historical models which support such a structure. President Johnson realized that US The pre-CORDS interagency situation in Vietnam, and the lack of coordination between agencies, contained many similar problems facing today's combatant commands.
There was a "dual chain of command that failed to coordinate military and civilian efforts."
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Multiple agencies attempted to accomplish similar missions, including an ambassador responsible for overall US action in South Vietnam, and a military with vastly superior resources as compared to the other agencies. CORDS ensured that the ambassador retained overall authority, but recognized that the full mass of the US effort would be required for success and should be unified into one comprehensive package under the full authority of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) commander. 13 Similarly, the geographic combatant commands maintain responsibility for US interests around the globe, with huge resources, and facing situations which seldom allow for unilateral military solutions.
The necessity of interagency unity of effort is not disputed. The challenge is how best to achieve unity of effort despite the different cultures, priorities, and interests of each The creation and evolution of CENTCOM's JIACG highlights the struggle for combatant commands to embrace interagency coordination outside of a staff structure.
CENTCOM's JIACG was the first to be created after Secretary Rumsfeld authorized their creation, and it comprised a small group focused strictly on counterterrorism, deploying as a specialized unit. 28 It broadened into a larger group more representative of the whole of government approach, but still limited by the agencies' control over their participating agents. Finally, the group was treated like a task force, not as part of the command staff, and splinter cells were transferred throughout the region based on specific needs, even acting as the equivalent of a command team until an embassy was established. 29 It has now culminated as the Interagency Task Force for Irregular Warfare, highlighting its transformation from small task force, to large interagency group, and back to being a task force. 30 According to one of their Deputy POLADs, the command's four-person State Department office serves strictly as advisor to the combatant commander, operating as an entity outside of both the command structure and JIACG, reviewing proposals and 26 Pope, "Interagency Task Forces, [124] [125] [126] Ibid., 125. 28 Schwarzenberg, "Where are the JIACGs Today?," 30. 29 Bogdanos, "Transforming Joint Interagency Coordination," 6-11. 30 Schwarzenberg, "Where are the JIACGs Today?," 30.
coordinating with the State Department in Washington. 31 Their evaluations are still signed by their own department, but the military chief of staff has a role in rating their performance.
He added that many of the other interagency personnel have started to integrate, with FBI personnel in J-3, CIA in J-2 (Intelligence), and USAID personnel working in both J-3 and J-
5
. 32 This partial integration should serve the commander better than keeping the interagency personnel separated in a JIACG. While successful in its own right, the JIACG in CENTCOM functioned more as a multi-role JIATF the commander could use as a crisis team instead of a staff helping to mold overall unity of effort, highlighting the possibility of inefficiency when interagency personnel are not integrated into a staff structure.
SOUTHCOM has also been highlighted because of its interagency successes, due to the highly touted JIATF-South organization. Unlike CENTCOM's use of its JIACG like a task force, SOUTHCOM created this task force specifically to align efforts towards a single mission: counternarcotics. This is the distinction between JIATFs and true interagency coordination at the combatant command level. A JIATF is a small group with a singular mindset and mission, whereas interagency personnel assigned to a combatant command staff must be integrated to provide unity of effort across the entire scope of regional involvement.
While not a replacement for integrated interagency staff efforts, the success of JIATF-S makes it a model for coordination efforts and "the benchmark interagency organization to emulate." Importantly, however, this degree of agency trust is entirely voluntary, and is difficult to garner and maintain at a higher level.
Although JIATF-South is an interagency success, SOUTHCOM's headquarters structure itself was questioned after the response to the earthquake in Haiti, but its initial failures resulted from an overall restructuring experiment and was not based on interagency integration. Southern Command reorganized into a directorate structure in 2008, in an effort to enhance efficiency and better conduct interagency relations. 35 They reorganized from the traditional J-codes to a modern business-like organization in an attempt to more successfully accomplish its regional stability and security mission. They also established their State Department POLAD as a civilian deputy commander, responsible for the interagency personnel and coordination efforts. According to joint doctrine, a commander has the freedom to organize their command as they desire to accomplish their assigned mission. are still somewhat independent as a separate group. However, as often happens without a codified structure, a change in leadership led to reorganization. They are now split between outside entities, with the POLAD being part of the special staff (and not a deputy commander) and a majority of the remaining interagency efforts in the JIACG assigned to the J-9 directorate. 41 Although PACOM greatly supports interagency efforts, it does not have a civilian deputy or interagency personnel integrated directly into its staff structure.
CONCLUSIONS
The struggle for unity of effort has evolved throughout the last century and the beginning of the current one. Its evolution has flowed from a willingness of the Army and efforts. This concept attempts to link global military and civilian efforts by combining personnel into one command headquarters, but fails to fully integrate them. By attaching them onto the structure as a separate entity, it allows for increased coordination but invites isolation and stove piping of effort. The interagency personnel are involved to the extent that they are tasked, rather than being fully integrated. These problems could be addressed by an entire combatant command reorganization, with a requirement from Congress to be of a whole of government construct. While ideal in theory, the legislation required for such an enormous shuffle is not likely to come soon, if ever. Because of the present need for better interagency coordination, and due to the current political environment, commanders must take action themselves and not wait for it to be legislated.
The CORDS program and current AFRICOM construct provide ample historical and modern support for a civilian-led command component. The single combatant commander retains the best possible unity of command, while civilian and military deputies integrate their personnel towards unity of effort. The current legislation cannot support a fully integrated structure, but military and interagency personnel, working side by side and reporting to their respective deputies, can provide more complete unity of effort. The JIACG was a great first step towards integration, but the evolution of interagency inclusion cannot be allowed to stall with the interagency effort relegated to a separate organization pinned to the overall structure. The concept of unity of effort demands interagency inclusion, and requires that agency personnel be integrated into the command structure to work alongside their military counterparts.
RECOMMENDATIONS
First, the most immediate change a combatant commander should make is to elevate the POLAD to the position of Civilian Deputy Director. AFRICOM was designed with this construct, and SOUTHCOM has recently changed to it. A civilian deputy displays the importance of interagency coordination both to his or her own assigned personnel and to the various departments, organizations and foreign entities with which the command interacts. A civilian deputy can also coordinate and be responsible for interagency efforts within the command organization. This is the easiest and most effective change a commander can make to enhance their command's whole of government approach.
Secondly, commanders should move from the JIACG construct to one of integration.
True unity of effort includes military and civilian personnel working together as part of a combined staff, not working separately and comparing efforts afterwards. JIACGs were also not designed to be a task force, but a way for interagency expertise to be part of the command itself. JIATFs function very well for their limited intended purpose, and should remain separate from the integrated interagency staff. The practical interagency evolution began with JIACGs, but the growth process must continue with a transition to fully integrated staffs to allow for more complete unity of effort within the combatant command.
